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SECURITY INFORMATION

8 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

SUBJECT : Guatemala

1. Early in July Mr. Dulles, [ ] and myself visited the State Department where we had a conference at which were present Assistant Secretary of State [ ], his Deputy, Mr. [ ], and Mr. [ ]. The CIA delegation posed the following three questions: (as well as I can remember)

1. Would the State Department like to see a different government in Guatemala?

2. Would the State Department oppose a government established by the use of force?

3. Does the State Department wish CIA to take steps to bring about a change of government?

2. The first question was answered positively. The second question was answered negatively. The third question was not answered clearly but by implication, positively.

3. Mr. Dulles asked me to make a Memorandum of Conversation in long-hand and deliver the one copy to him. I did this and waited in his office while he showed it to the Director. In a few minutes I was called into the Director's office, and it was soon clear that the Director was dissatisfied with the lack of a direct answer to the third question. He then telephoned to Mr. [ ] to make arrangements for a meeting.

4. I later gathered from Mr. Dulles that the Director had received a satisfactory answer from Mr. [ ]

[ ]

[ ]

Distribution:
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 11 JUNE 54

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

8

FROM : [ ]

ACTION: DD/P (L) (1)

INFO : DCI (2), D/DCI (3), WH (PBS) (4-6), WH (7), SA/PC/DCI (8)

[ ] (IN 16929) 1933Z 11 JUN 54 PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE

TO: PRITY SLINC INFO: PRITY DIR TO [ ] CITE: [ ]

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

FROM [ ]

1. BELIEVE WAR OF NERVES WORKING ON [ ] AMBASSADOR TO [ ] WHO NOT EATING AND APPEARS ON VERGE OF COLLAPSE. PUTS UP BRAVE FRONT BUT SINCE DOES NOT DRINK, POUCHES UNDER EYES INDICATE IN BAD SHAPE FROM WORRY. HE MAY BE HARD CORE COMMIE, BUT BEGINNING DOUBT.

2. AS DISTINGUISHED FROM HIS LINE OF SIX WEEKS AGO TO EFFECT "NO COMMIES IN [ ] AND DENIAL KNOWLEDGE FORTUNY, HE NOW PROPOSES [ ] CAN AND WILL CLEAN OWN HOUSE. SUSPECT HE MAY HAVE SINCERELY ACCEPTED AS FACT THIS CHANGE OF PROPAGANDA LINE.

3. BELIEVE HE FEARS HE ON THE LIST. SUCH LISTING STRATEGY BOUND HAVE EFFECT; SUGGEST CALLIGERIS FOLLOW THIS UP, GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION ATTEMPT DEFECTION SUBJECT WITH CALLIGERIS

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1 June 1954

Memorandum

TO: Chief/ Project

FROM: C/[ ]

SUBJECT: Provocation Plans

1. The following tentative suggestions are submitted for your consideration and possible further study. They are based on these basic assumptions:

a) D-Day must be reached within 30 days since weather conditions, political considerations and increasing security risks do not permit further postponements.

b) It is unlikely that the Project objective can be achieved by the means originally provided, i.e. primarily by CALLIGERIS' invading forces.

c) It is desirable that the events which might lead to the overthrow of the Guatemalan Government should at the same time either divert responsibility further away from the United States government or, on the contrary, provide justification for United States or even international (Panamerican) intervention.

2. I submit that under these circumstances, only a compact series of provocations, both domestic and foreign — i.e. inside Guatemala and outside, but attributable to Guatemalan government and communist forces — may conceivably have the desired result. The addition of a foreign provocation of major proportions appears mandatory since only action outside Guatemala can furnish justification for "interference with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation", in the eyes of international law as well as in the eyes of Guatemalan and international public opinion.

3. The most believable case of such a foreign provocation would seem to be a simulated Guatemalan aggression against Honduras. Recent developments there, the Guatemala-supported (if not Guatemala-provoked) strike, recall of two Guatemalan consuls for interference in that strike, today's revelations by Somoza's "spokesman" — all combined will make virtually any forthcoming hosti

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acts against Honduras believable for many people in Guatemala and in Honduras as elsewhere.

4. The proposed provocation in Honduras might be built up around the following events:

a) a bomb of Soviet origin explodes under Galvez' car, just one minute after he got out or a minute before he got into the car; the would-be assassin is to be arrested and will confess that he is a member of the PGT (membership book in pocket ?) , that he was introduced by a leading PGT official (Fortuny who is now "ill" ??) either to a mythical Soviet officer -- or, perhaps better, to one of the actually reported foreign agents somehow involved in the arms shipment (Zatz & Co) who hired him, appealing to his communist idealism to assist in the liberation of Honduras by killing Galvez. Some rouble notes, possibly a "get-away" passport with a Soviet, Polish or other communist visa, might be found on him.

b) a group of Guatemalans is captured by a Honduran border patrol near the Guatemalan border, but on Honduran territory, equipped with Soviet arms, with military maps, etc. A member of the group will admit that they are advance scouts of a Guatemalan force about to cross the border. (This should be coordinated with actual movements of Guatemalan troops in the same general area to lend credence to the story.)

c) A plane with Guatemala air force insignia should appear over Tegu, dropping leaflets which announce that the Guat troops come as liberators, calling upon the workers and peasants to disarm the forces of dictator Galvez, etc. (The same announcement might be made by radio over the wave length of an official Guat station). The leaflets may be printed in the form of a one-page special edition of the semi-official Guat Diario de Centro America.

d) a "premature" cable from the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, addressed to the presumable leader of the Honduran Communists -- or to Fortuny, c/o National Palace, Tegu --, might convey congratulations to the successful liberation and offer a Soviet loan and other "economic, educational and cultural help" to build up a people's democracy in Honduras.

5. Action along the above lines might be supplemented by whatever local action the situation there permits, for instance, provoking the local communists into rioting before government buildings, or the like. The details of the entire plan ought to be discussed thoroughly CALLIGERIS, before action is decided upon.

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6. The possibility cannot be excluded that a provocation attempt of the above type may succeed "too well", that is, that the local communists and other enemies of the regime, already armed and otherwise encouraged by Guat, may consider our provocation the signal and may proceed to overthrow the apparently weak and wavering Galvez regime. It will therefore be necessary to arrange for a strong U.S. amphibious or airborne force to stand by sufficiently near, ready to intervene at a moment's notice if the situation should get out of hand. This intervention would then be legitimate aid under the OAS mutual assistance pact since the U.S. troops would enter by request of Galvez. (From there, it might be possible to have the troops advance into Guatemala, still as aid to the defense of Honduras, if this is desired.)

7. In addition, a series of provocations should be set off inside Guatemala, starting several days before action in Honduras begins. This might be initiated with incidents like the following:

a) Setting fire either to a UFCO-owned finca, or to the house of a wealthy Guat land owner, finding the shell of a Soviet-made incendiary bomb (Napalm container?) nearby.

b) Kidnapping some people who are anti-communist and sufficiently prominent, perhaps even pretending murder: for instance, the wife and children of an American business man disappear: one might find bloodstained women's clothes at the shore of a nearby lake or swamp and some clues indicating that the murderess and/or kidnappers were communists, e.g. a crude inscription "Death to all Capitalists" with sickle and hammer on the wall of the house, or the like.

c) Desecrating a church or a cemetery, preferably a national shrine like the Cathedral in Antigua, for instance, by painting Lenin's "Religion is Opium for the People" (would fit in with our black leaflet from the "Fighting Godless")

d) Distributing a black communist leaflet, giving the ideological justification for the above acts, proclaiming people's terror against domestic capitalists and their church allies as well as against foreign imperialists and interventionists.

8. After a few days of the above have created a sufficiently strong impression of beginning communist terror, counter measures would set in, beginning with blowing up PGT offices, attacking homes of communist officials, using "personal nerve-war" techniques (see instructions for [ ] part II) to the utmost. If technically feasible, the forcible liberation of the prisoners at Salamá might have strong symbolic, encouraging effects. This might at the same time have value as a diversionary manoeuver.

9. D-Day inside Guat must be properly coordinated with events in Honduras, as suggested in para 4 above. It might be best to plan D-Day one or two days after the beginning of events in Honduras. The tie-in might be provided by the black broadcast suggested in para 4 - c, in which we either imitate Arbenz' voice or read a statement attributed to him: this would be the signal for the assassination of [ ] and the others (I strongly recommend including [ ] in that list.)

10. I am in no position to judge to which extent it will still be possible to carry out original D-Day plans any further -- but the succession of events suggested in the present memo, if accompanied by maximum publicity and properly exploited by all remaining PBSUCCESS assets might be expected to create a situation in which even a small force could overthrow the government, assuming of course, that the Guat Army assumes a friendly or at least neutral attitude towards our enterprise.

[ ]

Chief, [ ]

[ ]

31 May 1954